Historical Documents - Office of the Historian (2024)

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

Appeal of the Magyar Section of the Communist Party to Magyar Prisoners of War

Comrades! An enormous danger is approaching us. The Czech formations which were bought by the Tsar, and afterwards by the government of Kerensky, have sold themselves to the counter-revolutionary Russian bourgeoisie. Under the pretense of being dispatched to the French front, they are traveling to the heart of Siberia, to the grain-producing regions. When they saw they were many, they treacherously fell upon the Soviet authority and introduced in [Page 255] Chelyabinsk a régime of terror. They shot and robbed the town and Soviet, who, attacked unexpectedly, were not in a position to resist. Seizing the power, they began a bloody reckoning with the prisoners. If some Magyar or German prisoner of war fell into their hands, not one was left alive. They murdered mercilessly under the influence of national hatred. This corrupted miserable band sprang from Chelyabinsk to Omsk. The Omsk Soviet of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies took steps to prevent this dangerous company from reaching here. To meet them was sent out a delegation for negotiation accompanied by 200 Red Guards. According to the order of the Commissary for Foreign Affairs, they were told to lay down their arms. The rascals did not submit to the order, and began to fire at the Red Guards. A fight ensued. Comrades Rakop and Babka were taken prisoner and slaughtered without mercy. In every place hitherto occupied by them, they have opened fire on the German-Magyar prisoners and slaughtered mercilessly whoever fell into their hands. Savage national hatred has transformed them into mad animals, and now they wish to take into their hands our fate.

Comrades! It must not be permitted that we sit idly like dolls while this band fastens itself on our necks. The Soviet hasdecided to defend itself. The Omsk proletariat is fighting against the Czech formations at Maryanovka. But the Soviet forces are insufficient. Every moment threatens dangers and therefore we must prepare for defense in the widest measure. Before us stands open the question: to exist or not to exist. The Soviet has placed at the disposition of the central organization 1,000 rifles. These 1,000 rifles we must use if we wish to guard ourselves and the Russian revolution, which is our ally and the basis of our future revolution.

Comrades! The leaders of the country call to arms. Every organized workman must take arms. As soon as we shatter the formations, peaceful relations will again insue and we will lay down our arms, but until then we must hold them in our hands.

Comrades! The innocent blood of our brothers must be avenged. Our lives and the salvation of future proletarianism demands that we honorably take our place in the fight of the Omsk proletariat.

Each foreign organized proletarian to arms!

Long live the world revolution begun by the Russian proletariat!

Away with the corrupted troops falling upon us!

Long live the victorious proletariat dictatorship!

Long live the armed foreign proletariat!

The Magyar Section of the Russian Communistic Party

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

Official Statement by the Temporary Executive Committee of the Czecho-Slovak Army, Placed in Charge of Military and Political Affairs by the Assembly of Soldiers at Chelyabinsk

The principle of the neutrality of the Czecho-Slovak Army as regards the internal conflicts and battles of Russia was definitely expressed and recognized both in the agreement and treaty made by the Czecho-Slovak National Council with the Temporary Government of Russia, and in that arrived at later with the government of the Ukrainian republic, the Ukrainian National Council. To this principle both political and military leaders adhered firmly, and succeeded in implanting it so deeply in the minds of the soldiers, that, in spite of the attempts made right and left to induce them to break it, not a single section of the army could be induced to do so.

Later, when the Ukrainian National Council was defeated and gradually driven out of the governments on the eastern side of the Dnieper and later out of Kiev and the rest of the Ukraine, the commander in chief of the Soviet forces, Colonel Muraviev, and Mr. Kochubinski, the Minister of War of the Soviet government of the Ukraine, recognized the strict armed neutrality of the Czecho-Slovak Army. (See official order to the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps No. 12, January 28, 1918, published in the Czecho-Slavenny Dennik [Czechoslovak Daily], the official organ of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.)

Prior to this, when on January 12, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council adopted the “fourth universal,” which expressed the desire of the Ukrainian government “to live on terms of friendship and harmony with all neighboring states,” and especially with Austria, it was decided at a meeting of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, at which Professor Masaryk himself presided, “to declare the Czecho-Slovak Army in all parts of the former Russian state as a part of the autonomous army of the Czecho-Slovaks in France.” This proclamation was published on February 10, 1918, after the arrival of the Bolsheviks in Kiev. Soon after that, simultaneously with the success of the peace negotiations of the delegates of the Soviet and Ukrainian governments with the representatives of the Central powers at Brest Litovsk, definite steps were taken to arrange for the departure of the Czecho-Slovak Army to the French front.

The first movement was to be the concentration of all our forces on the eastern side of the Dnieper, and this was to be carried out on the basis of an agreement made with the Ukrainian Soviet government, which at one time planned to establish a front against the Germans in the Ukraine. (See Czecho-Slavenny Dennik, No. 102.) In the meantime, however, the Germans began to threaten the Czecho-Slovaks from both flanks, and they were obliged to retire into the territory of Great Russia. Again this retirement was made in complete agreement with the Soviet authorities in the Ukraine, an arrangement having been reached with the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the commander of the Soviet forces of the south Russian republics, Antonov-Ovseinko. On the basis of this agreement an order was issued to the Czechoslovak Army Corps (No. 26, March 16, 1918) to turn over to the Soviet forces all superfluous arms and other military equipment, while Antonov on his part issued an order to all revolutionary forces of the south Russian republics (No. 92, March 16) from which the following is a literal extract:

Our comrades of the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps, who fought so bravely and gloriously at Zhitomir, Kiev, Grebenka and Bakhmach, defending the way to Poltava and Kharkov, are now leaving Ukrainian territory and are turning over to us a part of their military equipment. The revolutionary army will never forget the fraternal assistance rendered by the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps in the battle of the working people of the Ukraine against the thieving bands of imperialism. The military equipment given up by the Czecho-Slovaks the revolutionary army accepts as a fraternal gift.

On the basis of this agreement, Antonov consented to the departure of the Czecho-Slovaks from the Ukraine, and the staff of the Soviet Army of Great Russia also agreed to our departure towards the east and issued the necessary orders to the railway officials who were to attend to the details of the transport on behalf of the Soviet government. Agreement to our departure from Russia via Vladivostok was also expressed in telegrams sent by Lenin and Trotsky.

In Penza, however, a new set of negotiations was begun. The Council of People’s Commissioners in Moscow demanded the complete disarmament of [Page 257] the Czecho-Slovak Army. As the result of the negotiations between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Moscow authorities a telegram was sent from Moscow on March 26, signed by Stalin, in which a certain number of arms were to be left to each echelon to provide protection against attack by counter-revolutionists. In this same telegram the promise was made to “help in every way possible the Czecho-Slovaks as long as they remain on Russian territory, provided they maintain an honest and sincere loyalty.” Further the Penza Soviet was ordered to appoint reliable commissioners who were to accompany the Czecho-Slovak echelons to Vladivostok, see that their unity as an organization was unimpaired, and at the same time keep the Council of People’s Commissioners informed as to the progress of the transport. In this same telegram it was stated “that telegrams with necessary instructions would be sent by the Council of People’s Commissioners to all interested parties.”

Our army maintained an honest and sincere loyalty. But meanwhile the Soviet government proceeded to break its word at every step. The Penza Soviet named but one commissioner, who went on ahead to Vladivostok with the first echelon, and there sat down and did nothing. In spite of our repeated requests that other commissioners be named, the Penza authorities absolutely refused to do this, giving as an excuse the lack of suitable men.

The local Soviets one after another put all sorts of obstacles in our path. In Samara, but 400 versts beyond Penza, the local soviet demanded that we give up more of our arms. These demands were repeated in Ufa, Zlatoust, Omsk, Irkutsk, Chita, and so on all along the line. The representatives of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, as well as the commanders of the various echelons, used every possible means to prevent the movement of our transports from being halted. In Samara the echelons gave up 138 rifles apiece, leaving only 30 to an echelon; in Omsk each echelon gave up a machine gun, and in Irkutsk more rifles, until there were left but 20 to an echelon. The negotiations of these local Soviets, being in clear opposition to the orders of the Council of People’s Commissioners quoted above, often had the appearance of bargaining at the bazar, and for the Czecho-Slovak soldiers were insulting in the extreme, and had the effect of increasing every day their mistrust of the Soviet government, and in creating a disgust for them which ever grew stronger.

One great reason for this lack of confidence and disgust was the attitude assumed by the Soviet authorities, both local and central, towards those who had deserted the Czecho-Slovak Army and joined the ranks of the Red Army. There were not many of them, and they were bad soldiers and men of weak character. They went over to the Soviet army for mercenary reasons. The munificent salaries, the opportunity to at once assume a position of high rank, fear of the French front, petty personal spite—these were the motives that led these men to desert their comrades. Our soldiers knew these men, and were glad that they were rid of them. The Soviet government welcomed these deserters and supported them in every way possible. At Penza the Soviet named some of these deserters as their representatives on the commission which had charge of receiving the arms given up by the Czecho-Slovaks. Other deserters holding documents from the Soviet political or military authorities insisted on coming into the Czecho-Slovak echelons to carry on agitation for the Red Army, and to determine if we did not have some arms hidden away.

These deserters, who called themselves Social Revolutionists, internationalists and communists, often declared that the holding up of our transport and all the obstacles put in our path were for the purpose of causing dissension within our ranks, and gaining as many recruits as possible for the Red Army. [Page 258] They declared that this was the reason why the Soviet government wished a part of the troops to go by way of Archangel; that somewhere on the way in a region where no food was to be had they planned to halt us, and compel us from very hunger to join their ranks.

The Czecho-Slovak National Council exercised all its influence with the army to keep them from taking stock in these tales, and to induce them to keep their patience and as good soldiers not to make any reply to the unfaithfulness and insulting behavior of the Soviet government.

The atmosphere was therefore highly charged with electricity when the Chelyabinsk incident occurred. At Chelyabinsk besides the Czecho-Slovak echelons there stood several trains filled with prisoners on their way home to Austria and Germany. The relations between the Czecho-Slovak soldiers and these prisoners was good, as it was uniformly whenever they came in contact with one another on the road. The soldiers did carry on an agitation amongst them against Austrian and German imperialism, and laughed at them for returning to serve once more under Austrian and German officers. But at the same time they felt sorry for them, and often shared their food with them. On May 14 one of these prisoners threw a piece of iron out of a train that was just leaving, wounding one of the Czecho-Slovak soldiers. The soldiers immediately surrounded the car from which the iron had been thrown, and demanded that the guilty prisoner be given up to them. When this was done, they immediately killed him. In the course of the investigation of this affair, the local Soviet called as witnesses the members of the guard which had been on duty at the station. But, instead of hearing their testimony, they put these men under arrest. A deputation which was later sent by the Czechoslovaks to demand the release of the guard was likewise put under arrest. This illegal imprisonment of their fellows was more than the soldiers in the echelons at Chelyabinsk could stand, and, led by their commanders, they marched into the city, released their imprisoned comrades, and returned immediately to their trains. No attack by force was made, the whole proceeding was conducted in an orderly and quiet manner, hardly a shot being fired.

The local Soviet proceeded to describe this action on the part of the Czechoslovaks in lurid colors in telegrams sent out in all directions. Believing the information thus imparted to them, the Council of People’s Commissioners issued an order to completely disarm all Czecho-Slovak echelons. At the same time orders were issued to the Soviets of all cities where our echelons were then located to proceed against them by force. Accordingly almost on the same day the Soviet forces, composed for the most part of Magyar and German prisoners of war, fell upon the Czecho-Slovak echelons which were almost entirely disarmed. At the attack made upon echelons of the Sixth Czecho-Slovak Regiment at Maryanovka, near Omsk, the Czecho-Slovaks suffered losses amounting to 10 killed and 10 severely wounded. The staff of the First Regiment, whose echelon was attacked at Zlatoust, defended itself with stones against the machine guns and rifles of the Bolsheviks, but lost 6 men killed and 10 severely wounded, and was compelled to make its way across the Urals on foot. Similarly the staff of the Second Artillery Brigade was attacked at Innokentevskaya, near Irkutsk, when they had already given up their arms. Machine guns placed in the windows of the railway station opened up a heavy fire upon the Czecho-Slovaks, but in spite of the fact that the men had no arms except a few hand grenades, they succeeded in clearing the station of Bolshevik forces and in capturing their machine guns. A fourth attack was made at Serodobsk, south from Penza, but as yet there is no detailed information in regard to it, owing to the fact that communication has not yet been established with the so-called Penza [Page 259] group of echelons. All of these attacks were made on May 27 and the following two or three days, immediately after the issuance of the order from Moscow to disarm the Czecho-Slovaks at any cost.

Prior to these events, but after the first incident at Chelyabinsk, the assembly of Czecho-Slovak soldiers, met for its annual meeting, had decided that in view of the tense situation existing between the Soviet government and the Czechoslovaks, vigorous measures must be taken immediately in order to secure the rapid passage of the trains towards Vladivostok. Accordingly delegates were dispatched to all echelons with instructions to proceed ahead at any cost, and an executive committee was appointed to see that these plans were carried out. The executive committee in formulating its plans counted on the probability of an armed conflict with the Bolshevik forces, but felt confident that they would be able to force their way through to Vladivostok in spite of any resistance that might be offered by the Soviet forces. The reason for their confidence in the successful outcome of their new plan lay not only in the well-known weakness of the Red Army, but also in their knowledge that the people at large were sick and tired of the Bolshevik rule, and that therefore they would not turn a hand to help the Bolsheviks in any possible conflict with the Czecho-Slovaks. Furthermore, the Czecho-Slovaks from their intimate, knowledge of political conditions throughout Russia judged that the feeling against the Bolsheviks was strongest in the very regions where most of their echelons were located, namely in the Urals and western Siberia. The executive committee, therefore, in planning their action, took cognizance of these facts, and planned to take advantage both of the weakness of the Red Army and of the strong popular feeling against the Bolsheviks to force their way through to the east. That their action would be accompanied by or followed by the overthrow of the Soviet government and the establishment of a new government in western Siberia never entered into their calculations, although later when the fall of the Soviet government was an accomplished fact, the Czecho-Slovaks were the first to welcome the new government and to lend it their moral and armed support.

The plans of the executive committee for the forcing of the passage to Vladivostok had not been thoroughly worked out when the events of May 25–26 brought things to an issue. By its cowardly attacks upon the Czechoslovak echelons the Soviet government began a warfare against the Czechoslovaks, the object of which was, according to the command of Trotsky, to disarm and disband the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps, place them in prison camps, and there try to enlist them in the ranks of the Red Army or to put them out at hard labor. In short, they wished to destroy entirely the Czechoslovak Army, that important moral support of the revolutionary movement of the Czecho-Slovaks and the other oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

After the first order to disarm completely the Czecho-Slovak echelons, there still remained the possibility of diplomatic negotiations. But after the attacks made upon the echelons on May 25–26, the soul of each soldier cried out for revenge for the blood of his innocent comrades. And so there was nothing left but war, a war which has already resulted in the seizure of almost the entire Siberian Railway by the Czecho-Slovaks and the fall of the Soviet government all along the line.

The Czecho-Slovaks are convinced that the action taken against them by the Soviet government was dictated from Berlin by Von Mirbach. This conviction is based on the opinion, very widely spread throughout Russia, that the Soviet government are the paid agents of Germany. This conviction grew stronger as repeated attempts were made to disarm the soldiers, for the men could not [Page 260] but see in this disarmament real danger, knowing as they did that the central Soviet government was really powerless, and that in most places the chief strength of their armed forces consisted in armed German and Magyar prisoners. For example, in Omsk the commander of the forces of the internationalists composed of prisoners was an Austro-Hungarian officer, a Magyar by race. This officer, Ligeti by name, had all the Czecho-Slovaks and other Slavs who were serving in the Red Army disarmed, so that Omsk was really in the hands of this Austro-Hungarian officer. In Ishim the Red Army was composed entirely of Magyars. In Petropavlovsk the men who came to negotiate with the Czechoslovaks in the guise of Czech communists afterward proved to be the representatives of the German section of the internationalists. The commanding officers of the Red Army were in many cases Germans and Magyars, judging by the orders and the curses in those tongues that were heard on all sides during the battles. When the echelon was attacked near Irkutsk, there was heard the command: “Schiessen!”

The conviction that the Soviet government wished to destroy our forces was also strengthened by the constant holding up of the transport, for which no adequate cause could be found. At first the delay was blamed upon the Amur Railway, where transportation was reported to have been halted. The advance of sem*nov upon Irkutsk was given as an excuse. But the Czecho-Slovaks soon learned that transportation on the Amur Railway had been soon resumed, while the advance of sem*nov existed more in the imagination of the Soviet authorities than in reality. Amongst other excuses given was that of a lack of locomotives on the Amur road, but all the while German prisoners were being merrily transported towards the west, and there were plenty of locomotives for them.

On April 20, the People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Chicherin sent the following telegram to the Siberian Soviets: “Transport German prisoners as rapidly as possible towards the west. Hold back the Czecho-Slovak echelons.”

It was only after a long and tedious session of negotiations that there was secured an order for the renewal of our transport towards Vladivostok. One day, about May 15, a member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council was officially informed that the trains would now be moved. On the very next day, however, he learned through private conversation with the railway officials that another order had been issued in Irkutsk to stop the movements of the Czecho-Slovak trains. He finally learned that this command had issued from the commander of the Soviet forces at Irkutsk, General von Taube, a German, whose adjutant had issued the order by “mistake.”

The Seventh Czecho-Slovak Regiment captured a German engineer, who had been commandeered from Moscow to destroy the bridges and tunnels on the railroad beyond the Baikal. In Troitsk the commanders of the Soviet artillery were all Austrian officers.

From all these facts even an uninterested onlooker may picture to himself the net which had been spread for the Czecho-Slovak Army. Inasmuch as the warfare is still being carried on on all sides, it has not been possible to gather all the evidence from the Soviet offices, and unfortunately in many cases the Bolsheviks succeeded in carrying away with them or destroying all their papers before our men took possession. Later however there will be certainly found many proofs of the truth of the assertion made by the president of the Chelyabinsk Soviet and the military commissioner in that town, who informed our representatives in confidence shortly before the outbreak of hostilities that the cause of all the acts against the Czecho-Slovaks was the German Ambassador at Moscow.